Abstract-We consider dynamics and protocols for agents seeking an equilibrium in a network game with proximal quadratic cost coupling. We adopt an operator-theoretic perspective to show global convergence to a network equilibrium, under the assumption of convex cost functions with proximal quadratic couplings, time-invariant and timevarying communication graph along with convex local constraints, and a time-invariant communication graph along with convex local constraints and separable convex coupling constraints. We show that proximal dynamics generalize opinion dynamics in social networks and are applicable to distributed tertiary control in power networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivation: Distributed decision making in networks populated by rational agents is currently an active field of research across several areas, such as network systems and control, signal processing, computational game theory, and operations research. Application domains are, in fact, numerous and include power systems [1] , [2] ; demand side management [3] - [5] ; network congestion control [6] , [7] ; social networks [8] , [9] ; consensus and flocking [10] , [11] ; and robotic and sensor networks [12] , [13] . Advantageously, distributed computation and communication setups allow each agent to keep its own data private and exchange information with selected agents only. Typically, in networked multiagent systems, the state (or decision) variables of each agent evolve as a result of local decision making, for example, local optimization subject to private constraints, and distributed communication with some other agents, according to a communication graph. It then follows naturally that the aim of the agents is to reach a collective equilibrium state, where no agent can benefit from updating its decision variables.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TCNS. 2017.2754358 under the assumption of strongly convex quadratic cost functions and time-invariant communication graph; in [15] and [16] , under the assumption of differentiable cost functions with Lipschitz continuous gradient, strictly monotone pseudogradient game mapping (hence, strictly convex cost functions), and undirected, possibly time-varying, communication graph. Multiagent games with convex compact local and coupling constraints have been considered in [17] under the assumption of strongly convex twice differentiable cost functions with bounded gradients, with a strictly increasing congestion cost term. Whenever the communication graph is a complete graph with uniform weights, network games reduce to aggregative games studied, for example, in [4] , [15] , [18] , and [19] , the latter under the assumption of strongly convex quadratic cost functions and a time-invariant communication graph. Incentive mechanisms for agents playing aggregative games with strongly convex cost functions, convex local and coupling constraints have first been studied in [20] , and more generally in [21] , both with a timeinvariant communication graph. Multiagent convex constrained optimization has been considered in [22] , under the assumption of uniformly bounded subgradients, and either homogeneous constraint sets or time-invariant, complete communication graph with uniform weights; in [23] , under the assumption of differentiable cost functions with Lipschitz continuous and uniformly bounded gradients; and in [24] . We note that in [23] and [24] , convergence is proven for agent dynamics with vanishing step sizes, which slows down the convergence rate and prevents the protocols to be translated into a continuous-time counterpart, as usual, for example, in power systems [1] , [2] , [25] , [26] . In general, the theory of generalized (quasi-) variational inequalities [27] , [28] and their solution algorithms are applicable to both game equilibrium seeking, under the assumption of convex differentiable cost functions [28, Sec. 10 and 12] , [29, Sec. 12] , [30, Part II] , and to convex optimization [31, Sec. 25] . However, the presence of a structured, possibly time-varying, communication graph in multiagent network games and multiagent optimization generates the need to design distributed computation and structured information exchange.
Paper Contribution: We develop a mathematical framework for multiagent network games with proximal quadratic cost couplings and show global convergence of multiagent proximal dynamics and protocols. Thus, we adopt an operator-theoretic perspective, which is new in the area of multiagent and network systems, and allows us to be the first to address network games with nonsmooth objective functions, time-varying communication, and coupling constraints. Technically, our main contributions are summarized next.
r We consider time-invariant (Sections II and III) and timevarying (Section IV) dynamics and protocols for agents playing network games with convex cost functions and proximal couplings, convex local constraints, and separable convex coupling constraints (Section V).
r We show that proximal dynamics in multiagent network games are fixed-point iterations with a specific structure.
r We derive a distributed protocol for multiagent network games with separable convex coupling constraints (Section V).
r We exploit operator theory (Section VI) to show global convergence of some classes of multiagent dynamics (Section VII).
r We show that proximal dynamics in multiagent network games generalize opinion dynamics in social networks (Section VIII-A) and are applicable to distributed tertiary control in power networks (Section VIII-B). Notation and Basic Definitions: R, R > 0 , R ≥0 , respectively, denote the set of real, positive, and non-negative real numbers; R := R ∪ {∞}; N denotes the set of natural numbers; for
I denotes the identity matrix; 0 (1) denotes a matrix/vector with all elements equal to 0 (1); to improve clarity, we may add the dimension of these matrices/vectors as subscript. A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker product between matrices A and B. A denotes the maximum singular value of matrix A. Id : R n → R n denotes the identity operator. ι S : R n → {0, ∞} denotes the indicator function for the set S ⊆ R n , i.e., ι S (x) = 0 if x ∈ S, ∞ otherwise. For a function f :
} denote the sets of fixed points and zeros, respectively.
II. MULTIAGENT NETWORK GAMES WITH LOCAL CONSTRAINTS
We consider N noncooperative agents, where each agent i ∈ N[1, N] has state variable x i ∈ X i ⊆ R n . We assume that the agents interact through a directed communication graph with an N × N adjacency matrix
where 
Remark 1: Nash and Wardrop-like equilibria. The network equilibrium concept in Definition 1 reduces to a Nash equilibrium or to a Wardrop-like equilibrium (Wardrop equilibrium with a finite number of players) in special cases. In (1), if a i,i = 0 for all i, then an NWE reduces to the network version of Nash equilibrium as in [9] , [14] , and [16] . We note that if (2) 
to represent the local optimization of the agents, and let us define the (n N) × (n N) matrix A := P ⊗ I n (5) to represent the distributed communication between neighboring agents. Then, it follows that the existence of an NWE can be shown via a fixed-point argument. We note that uniqueness of an NWE does not necessarily hold, see, for instance, [29, Example 12.4] . We refer to [29, Sec. 12.4] for sufficient conditions that ensure uniqueness of Nash equilibria in noncooperative games.
III. TIME-INVARIANT MULTIAGENT DYNAMICS

A. Distributed Banach Dynamics
We first analyze simple proximal dynamics, that are
and in collective compact form
We discuss in Section VI that the dynamics in (7) represent the Banach fixed-point iteration [31, eq. (1.67)] applied to the mapping prox f • A. Hence, let us call them Banach dynamics.
In this section, we assume that the adjacency matrix satisfies the following linear matrix inequality.
Assumption 1: Averaged adjacency matrix. The matrix P in (1) is such that
for some η ∈ (0, 1). We note that Assumption 1 holds true if the adjacency matrix is doubly stochastic, as assumed in [14 
and such that min i∈N [1,N ] a i,i =: a > 0, then it satisfies Assumption 1.
Proof: See Section VI-B.
We can now show global convergence of the Banach dynamics to an NWE.
Theorem 1: Global convergence of distributed Banach dynamics. If Assumption 1 holds, then the sequence (x(k))
defined as in (7) converges, for any initial condition, to a network equilibriumx, and (∀k ∈ N)
B. Distributed Krasnoselskij Dynamics
Whenever the communication matrix is doubly stochastic but not all self loops are present, the Banach dynamics cannot ensure convergence in general, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 1: Nonconvergence of Banach dynamics. The Banach dynamics for the game with N = 2 agents, n = 1,
and for
oscillates persistently; hence, it does not converge.
Instead, global convergence to an NWE can be achieved via averaged proximal dynamics. Specifically, for some α ∈ (0, 1),
(10) so that the collective dynamics read as
Analogously to the Banach dynamics in (7), we discuss in Section VI that the dynamics in (11) represent the Krasnoselskij fixed-point iteration [31, eq. (5.12) (fixed step)] applied to the mapping prox f • A; hence, we call them Krasnoselskij dynamics.
We show next global convergence of the distributed Krasnoselskij dynamics to an NWE, under the assumption that the adjacency matrix has norm at most unitary.
Assumption 2: Nonexpansive adjacency matrix. The matrix P in (1) is such that P ≤ 1, that is, (8) holds with η = 1.
Proposition 3: Doubly stochastic adjacency matrix.
Proof: Since P is doubly stochastic, we have that P 1 = P ∞ = 1; hence, by Hölder's inequality, P ≤ P 1 P ∞ = 1. (11) converges, for any initial condition, to a network equilibriumx, and (∀k ∈ N)
IV. TIME-VARYING MULTIAGENT DYNAMICS
In this section, we extend the setup in Section II and the convergence results in Section III to the case in which the communication between agents is time dependent. Thus, we consider a time-varying adjacency matrix
and analogously to (5), we define A(k) := P (k) ⊗ I n .
In the time-varying case, the notion of NWE and its existence are unclear in general. Thus, let us formulate the following existence assumption.
Assumption 3: Existence of persistent network equilibrium. There existsk ∈ N such that
A
. Time-Varying Banach and Krasnoselskij Dynamics
We are ready to generalize Theorems 1 and 2 in Section III to the time-varying case. Namely, we show global convergence of the time-varying Banach dynamics (∀k ∈ N)
and the time-varying Krasnoselskij dynamics (∀k ∈ N)
where α ∈ (0, 1). For the time-varying Banach dynamics, we assume that the adjacency matrix is persistently averaged, analogously to Assumption 1, while for the time-varying Krasnoselskij dynamics, we assume that the adjacency matrix is persistently NE, analogously to Assumption 2. Assumption 4: Persistently averaged adjacency matrix. There existsk ∈ N such that, for all k ≥k, the matrix P (k) in (13) is such that
for some η ∈ (0, 1).
Assumption 5:
Persistently nonexpansive adjacency matrix. There existsk ∈ N such that, for all k ≥k, the matrix P (k) in (13) is such that P (k) ≤ 1, that is, (17) holds with η = 1.
It follows from Propositions 2 and 3 that if the adjacency matrix is persistently doubly stochastic, then Assumption 5 holds true; if, in addition, the adjacency matrix has all self loops persistent, for example, as in [22 (16) converges, for any initial condition, to some vectorx = x 1 ; . . . ;x N , and (∀k ∈ N) the inequality in (12) holds. Convergence does depend on the time-varying communication graph. Whenever some communication graph with adjacency matrixP that can generate a persistent network equilibrium recurs infinitely often, then we can show that the agents reach an NWE for the game in (2) with adjacency matrixP .
Assumption 6: Feasible recurrent adjacency matrix. It holds that lim inf k →∞ P (k) −P = 0, where the matrixP satisfies Assumption 2, and that fix prox f • P ⊗ I n ⊆ E, with E defined as in (14) . 
V. MULTIAGENT NETWORK GAMES WITH LOCAL AND COUPLING CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we extend the setup in Section II to the case in which the agents are subject to both local and coupling constraints, the latter of the kind g(x) ≤ 0. Namely, for each agent i ∈ N[1, N], we consider a joint local and coupling constraint set that depends on the other agents, that is,
Let us then generalize Definition 1 to the case of network games with coupling constraints.
Remarkably, we can transform a generalized network game into an auxiliary (extended) network game [30, Sec. 3] and then, based on the latter, design a protocol that ensures convergence to a GNWE. With this aim, we start with the definition of the following auxiliary NWE.
Definition 3: Extended network equilibrium. The pair (x,λ), withx = x 1 ;x 2 ; . . . ,x N , is an Extended NetWork
For the existence of an equilibrium, we need to assume that the dual variables are bounded, which is implied by a standard constraint qualification, for example, the Slater or the MangasarianFromovitz constraint qualifications [29, p. 346, pp. 447-448] .
Standing Assumption 3: Bounded dual variables.
, such that the system of inclusions in (20) and (21) is equivalent tō
As usual in generalized games [30 
for some matrices C 1 , . . . , C N ∈ R M ×n and vector c ∈ R M .
Analogously to an NWE, also an ENWE in (20)- (21) can be characterized as a fixed point, and in turn related to a GNWE in (19) . To show that, first, we exploit a basic property of the proximal mapping [31, Proposition 12.28] , namely that the inclusion in (23) holds if and only if
Then, to combine (20) for all i ∈ N[1, N] and (25) together in compact form, let us define the mapping F :
and the mapping G : (x) ) as in (25) . We can now formalize that an ENWE in (20) - (21) generates a GNWE as defined in (19 Lemma 2 allows us to reformulate the GNWE problem as an NWE problem. However, the affine mapping G in (27) does not inherit from the linear mapping A · the properties that are sufficient for the convergence of the proximal dynamics studied in Section II. Indeed, the extended proximal dynamics
A. Distributed Tseng Protocol
To design a distributed protocol that ensures global convergence to a GNWE for the game in (19), we reformulate the fixed point problem arising in Lemma 2 into an equivalent zero finding problem. Technically, we exploit the following equivalence. 
x(k + 1/2)
x(k + 1)
We note that the update of the dual variable λ(k) shall be carried out by an (additional) agent that has full information on the coupling constraint, namely on the quantity g (x(k)). The protocol consists of four steps as summarized next: (28) : the agents exchange state information via the mapping G and then average the new information with their current state; (29) : the agents perform their local optimization in parallel via the weighted proximal mappings prox αf i and (28)- (31) converges, for any initial condition, to a generalized network equilibrium for the game in (19) .
Finally, note that for the global convergence of the distributed Tseng protocol, in Theorem 5, we do not assume that the communication matrix P is averaged or NE.
VI. OPERATOR THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE TO MULTIAGENT NETWORK GAMES
In the following, we adopt an operator theoretic perspective to multiagent dynamics. Specifically, in view of the compact notations that describe the collective multiagent dynamics, namely the Banach dynamics in (7), the Krasnoselskij dynamics in (11), the time-varying dynamics in (15) and (16), and the forwardbackward-forward protocol in (28)- (31), we give to them the interpretation of fixed point iterations with special structure. Thus, in the next section, let us review the definitions and results that are necessary for the convergence proofs in Section VII.
A. Operator Theoretic Definitions and Results
Definition 4: Nonexpansive mapping. A mapping T :
Definition 5: Averaged mapping. A mapping T :
or equivalently if there exists a NE mapping B :
Note that if T isη-AVG, then it is η-AVG for all η ∈ (0,η], and that the inequality in (33) with η = 1 is equivalent to that in (32) , hence AVG mappings are NE.
The convergence proofs for the main statements in the paper are based on the following technical results. 
is such that lim k →∞ z(k) =z ∈ fix (T ). 
is such that
Proof: It follows from [34, Proposition 3.4 (iii)], since every cluster point of the sequence (z(k)) 
B. Application to Multi-agent Networks
In this section, we analyze the mappings that arise in multiagent network games under an operator theoretic lens, to provide some preliminary results for the main proofs in Section VII.
Lemma 8: If the matrix P satisfies Assumption 1, then the mappings P · and A · = (P ⊗ I n )· are η-AVG.
Proof: By Schur complement, the linear matrix inequality in (8) is equivalent to P P (2η − 1)I + (1 − η)(P + P ). Therefore, the linear mapping P · is η-AVG by Definition 5, as well as A·.
Lemma 9: If the matrix P satisfies Assumption 2, then the mappings P · and A · = (P ⊗ I n ) · are NE, and (∀α ∈ (0, 1)) the mappings ((1 − α) We can now prove Proposition 2.
Proof (Proposition 2):
Let η := 1 − a, where a := min i∈N [1,N ] , since a ∈ (0, 1) , η ∈ (0, 1) and (∀i) b i,i ≥ 0. Therefore, B is doubly stochastic, and by Proposition 3 and Lemma 9, B· is NE. Since P · is η-AVG, then A· is η-AVG as well due to Definition 5.
Lemma 10: The mappings prox f in (4) and F in (26) 
C. Non-strict Monotonicity of the Pseudogradient Game Mapping
To conclude the section, we show and discuss the monotonicity of the pseudogradient game mapping, and refer to solution algorithms for MON variational inequalities.
Let us consider the Nash game associated with the network game in (2) , that is, the game with best responses
for all i ∈ N[1, N]. The pseudogradient game mapping Θ :
N is defined as the matrix of partial subgradients [27, p. 197] 
Proof of Theorem 2:
By Lemma 9, the mapping A· in (5) is NE. Thus, the mapping prox f • A is the composition of two NE mappings, hence it is NE itself, and convergence holds by Lemma 5. Analogously to the proof of Theorem 1, we exploit the fact that the mapping
Proof of Theorem 3:
Convergence follows by applying Lemma 6 with T k := prox f (A(k) ·). Then the proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1, since, for all k ∈ N, T k is 
VIII. APPLICATIONS
A. Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks
Opinion dynamics in social networks have been modeled in the context of multiagent network games [8] , [9] , [35] . In i ∈ X i can represent limitations on the opinion of agent i on individual topics and also across the n topics.
For each agent i, we consider an initial opinion vector x i (0) ∈ X i and an ideal opinionx i ∈ X i , which is the opinion the agent would reach without interactions with other agents, and which need not to be equal to x i (0). Then, we model the opinion dynamics as (∀i ∈ N [1, N] , ∀k ∈ N)
The cost function in (39) has two addends: f i • (y −x i ) penalizes the deviation of the local opinion from the ideal opinion x i , namely, it weights the stubbornness of agent i, while the
penalizes the deviation of the local opinion from the weighted average among the opinions of the neighboring agents, possibly including the current local opinion x i (k) as a memory effect if a i,i (k) > 0. Therefore, in the extreme case that f i • = 0 and X i = [0, 1] n , agent i is typically referred as follower, while in the other extreme case that a i,j (k) = 0 for all j = i and k ∈ N, or X i = {x i }, agent i can be referred as fully stubborn.
If we assume that
• is lower semicontinuous, convex, and positive semidefinite, X i is nonempty, compact, and convex, P (k) = [a i,j (k)] is doubly stochastic for all k ∈ N, and that a persistent network equilibrium exists, then convergence to an NWE follows from the results in Section IV for the time-varying communication case, or in Section II for the time-invariant one.
Remark 3: Generalized opinion dynamics. The multiagent network game model in (39) reduces to the model in [35] if f i
2 for some θ i ≥ 0, then the model in (39) reduces to the Friedkin-Johnsen and De Groot models in [8] , [36] , [37] ; furthermore, in [37] it is assumed that all agents are followers, and in [8] it is assumed that there exists i such that θ i > 0 and that
Next, we investigate numerically and illustrate opinion dynamics on directed time-invariant graphs that have the topology of Barabási-Albert and Watts-Strogatz scale-free networks, with the addition of self loops of random weight- Fig. 1 shows two examples of such networks. We consider row stochastic, but not doubly stochastic, weighted adjacency matrices to explore the behavior of opinion dynamics beyond our theoretical guarantees. We run several numerical experiments to compare the distributed Banach dynamics in (7) Fig. 2 suggest that the convergence speed is not much affected by the network size.
B. Distributed Tertiary Control in Power Networks
Tertiary control in power networks has been considered as the solution to the optimal economic dispatch problem in terms of maximal social welfare [1] , [2] , [25] , [26] . constraints then read as the set of affine coupling constraints
We run some numerical experiments on the IEEE New England test power network, as shown in Fig. 3 , with susceptance parameters obtained from the Power Systems Toolbox. We set one undirected communication link between generators 1 and 7, namely, nodes 39 and 36 of the physical graph, and simulate a scenario where the imbalance is generated as follows: the largest power injection, at node 39, is reduced by 20% and the largest load demand, at node 1, is increased by 20%, compared to their nominal values. We compare the power imbalance under the Banach dynamics (for the mapping F • G) from (7), the Krasnoselskij dynamics from (11) and the Tseng protocol dynamics from (28)- (31) in several experiments. In our numerical experience, the Banach dynamics have the fastest convergence, although their global convergence is not supported theoretically. Fig. 4 shows a representative simulation.
IX. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Global convergence of selected classes of equilibrium seeking proximal dynamics hold in multiagent network games, under the assumption of convex cost functions with proximal quadratic coupling, time-invariant, and time-varying communication along with convex local constraints, time-invariant communication along with convex local constraints and separable coupling constraints.
More generally, equilibrium seeking dynamics for multiagent network games with the simultaneous presence of convex cost functions, time-varying communication, and convex (possibly nondifferentiable) coupling constraints are currently unexplored. We have modeled the information exchange between agents via a linear mapping and assumed nonexpansiveness, which holds true if the adjacency matrix is doubly stochastic. However, we believe that our convergence results can be extended to multiagent network games with row-stochastic adjacency matrix, and also, under appropriate regularity assumptions, to nonlinear information exchange mappings.
